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ABSTRACT
Of the many international laws affecting privacy rights that
developed during 2004, two of the most important are Canada's
Personal Information and Protection and Electronic Documents
Act ("PIPEDA "') and Japan's Personal Information Protection
Act. The legal and statutory history of both acts is reviewed
Additionally, this article analyzes the meanings of the various
terms and conditions within the two acts. Due to the recent
passage in 2003 of the Personal Information Protection Act, an in-
depth discussion of its language and requirements is provided
The Canadian case, Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway, is
used to illustrate the emerging requirements. and intricacies of
PIPEDA. Its analysis includes a discussion ofjurisdiction, the de
novo standard of review, and consent under PIPEDA. Also
included in the analysis of PIPEDA is a discussion of the four-part
test used to determine whether the purposes for collecting personal
information are those a reasonable person would consider
appropriate. Analysis of the Personal Information Protection Act
includes looking at the future impacts and interpretations of the
act. In particular, this article discusses the possible impacts the
act may have on United States businesses that do business in
Japan. Finally, the Personal Information Protection Act is viewed
in comparison with United States and European Union privacy
regulations and legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of personal information is not only an American
concern but is indeed an international one. Citizens living in countries
with even the most modest economies have concerns about their
privacy and whether their personal information is being misused. Two
countries that have recently taken measures to protect their citizenry's
personal information are Canada and Japan. In 2000, Canada enacted
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the Personal Information and Protection and Electronic Documents
Act ("PIPEDA"), and in 2003, Japan enacted the Personal Information
Protection Act. These pieces of legislation are just two of many
privacy measures that have been taken on the international front. Due
to the scale of these countries' economies, the amount of business
done with the United States, and the proximity of Canada to the United
States, PIPEDA and The Personal Information Protection Act are of
particular interest to the U.S. privacy community. Each Act will be
individually examined in this piece. The analysis of PIPEDA will
focus on the year 2004, while the analysis of Japan's Personal
Information Protection Act will begin with its legislative history in
2003, as much of the Act's provisions did not go into effect until April
1,2005.
II. 2004: PIPEDA AND EMPLOYER VIDEO SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS
On January 1, 2004, the last phase of Canada's federal privacy
legislation, the Personal Information and Protection and Electronic
Documents Act ("PIPEDA") went into full effect. PIPEDA requires
every organization in the course of commercial activity to ensure the
protection of individual privacy.' After three phases of the Act's
implementation, PIPEDA is now fully extended to cover all private
and public organizations that collect, use, or disclose personal
information. It also covers information about an employee of the
organization that the organization collects, uses, or discloses in
connection with the operation of federal work, undertaking, or
business. 2 As a result, organizations, agencies delegated to ensure
PIPEDA compliance, and the federal courts have had to address issues
arising from PIPEDA's full extension. In 2004, one of the main issues
involved employers' use of video surveillance of their employees in
the labor and employment context.
1 Personal Information and Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C., ch. 5, § 4(1)
(2000) (Can.) [hereinafter PIPEDA].
2 Ann Cavoukian, The State of Privacy and Data Protection in Canada, the European Union,
Japan andAustralia, 748 PRAC. L. INST. 363, 373 (2003).
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A. BACKGROUND
1. SCOPE OF PIPEDA
Canada's Parliament enacted PIPEDA on April 13, 2000 "to
support and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal
information that is collected, used or disclosed in certain
circumstances, by providing for the use of electronic means to
communicate or record information or transactions., 3 Based on ten
interrelated principles of the Model Code for the Protection of
Personal Information, Parliament formed the basis of PIPEDA's core
provisions.4 These provisions require: (1) "every organization" (2)
that "collects, uses or discloses" (3) personal information (4) "in the
course of commercial activities" to take steps to protect individual
privacy. 5  These four elements provide the scope of the Act's
applicability.
First, the Act defines an "organization" as an association,
partnership, person, or trade union. 6 According to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner, an organization includes both "brick-and-
mortar" and e-commerce businesses.
7
Second, an organization is subject to the Act's provisions in the
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information. "Use" is defined
as the "treatment and handling of personal information within an
organization," whereas "disclosure" pertains to the transfer of data
3 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at ch. 5, § 30.
4 Erika King & John H. Fuson, An Overview of Canadian Privacy Law for Pharmaceutical
and Device Manufacturers Operating in Canada, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 205, 206-08 (2002)
(the ten principles are (1) accountability; (2) identified purposes; (3) consent; (4) limited
collection; (5) limited use, disclosure, and retention; (6) accuracy; (7) security; (8) openness;
(9) right of access; and (10) compliance).
5 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at ch. 5, § 4(1).
6 Id. § 2(1).
7 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Backgrounder: The Personal Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, available at http://privcom.gc.ca/information/020607 e.asp (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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outside the organization.8 The Privacy Commissioner asserts that
collection, use, and disclosure are distinct events. 9
Third, these organizations are subject to the Act's definition of
"personal information." "Personal information" is defined as any
"information about an identifiable individual."' 0 It includes factual
information such as an individual's name, age, weight, height, medical
records, income, race, ethnic origin and color, marital status, religion,
education, and home address and phone number.'"
Last, the Act applies to "commercial activity," which is defined as
"any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of
conduct that is of a commercial character." 12  The Office of the
Privacy Commissioner, however, has not provided much guidance as
to this phrase's meaning.
13
2. THE FINAL PHASE OF PIPEDA
Rather than requiring immediate compliance, Parliament gradually
phased in PIPEDA in three stages. 14 In 2001, PIPEDA covered only
personal information processed by federally regulated entities, which
includes Internet service 15providers, banks, airlines, and
telecommunication companies. In 2002, the Act was extended to
cover personal health information, such as information concerning the
physical or mental health of the individual, donations by the individual
of any body part or any bodily substance of the individual, and
8 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, YOUR PRIVACY RESPONSIBILITIES: A GUIDE
FOR BUSINESSES AND ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2001) [hereinafter GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES].
9 George Radwanski, Privacy of Commissioner of Canada, Address to the Institute of
Canadian Advertising (Feb. 27, 2001), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/
02_05_a_010227_e.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
10 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch. 5, § 2(1).
11 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Your Privacy Rights: A Guide for
Individuals to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, available
at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/0205d08-e.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
12 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch. 5, § 2(1).
13 King & Fuson, supra note 4, at 213.
14 Michael E. Arruda, PLI Emerging Issues in Online Privacy 2002, 735 PRAc. L. INST. 57,70
(2003).
15 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at ch. 5, § 4; see also Cavoukian, supra note 2, at 373.
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information that is collected in the course of providing health services
to the individual.16
With the last phase now in effect, the Act is no longer limited to
federally regulated entities. Instead, PIPEDA is fully extended to
cover all private and public organizations that collect, use, or disclose
personal information, or information about an employee of the
organization that the organization collects, uses, or discloses in
connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking, or
business. 17  However, with the Act's full extension into both the
private and public sectors, organizations have encountered
uncertainties with proper compliance. For example, in 2004, Canada's
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the agency delegated to ensure
PIPEDA compliance, has had to address issues involving employers'
use of video surveillance of their employees in the labor and
employment context.
B. CASE SUMMARY: EASTMOND V. CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY
1. COMPLAINT WITH THE OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY
COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Erwin Eastmond filed a complaint with the Commissioner's Office
against his employer, Canadian Pacific Railway ("CP"). 18 Eastmond
alleged that CP violated provisions of PIPEDA after CP installed six
digital video recording surveillance cameras in the mechanical facility
area where he performed his job duties. 19  He argued that the
installation of video cameras in the workplace was done in secrecy
without any consultation with his union. He asserted further that
there was no security problem to justify the video camera installation,
that the system could be abused for monitoring conduct and work
performance of workers, and that the cameras had a negative effect on
employee morale.
2 1
16 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at ch. 5, § 2.
17 Cavoukian, supra note 2, at 373.
18 Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway, [2004] F.C. 852, 2.
'
9 See id. at 1.
20 Id. at 2.
21 id
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In response to Eastmond's complaint with the Commissioner, CP
issued three reasons for installing the cameras. It stated that the
cameras were necessary to: (1) reduce vandalism and deter theft; (2)
reduce CP's potential liability for property damage; and (3) provide
security for staff.22 To notify its employees, CP posted bulletins in
both its diesel and car shops advising all employees and managers of
the video camera installations.23 Also, CP posted signs at all entrance
areas around the mechanical facilities that warned individuals that the
facility was protected by video and electronic surveillance.
24
On January 23, 2003, the Privacy Commissioner issued his
report.25 The Commissioner found that Eastmond had a well-founded
complaint and recommended that CP remove its video surveillance
cameras.26 The Commissioner's recommendation was based upon his
findings of fact applied to subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA.27 Under that
provision, an organization may collect "personal information only for
purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate in
the circumstances. '" 28 As a result, the Commissioner believed that he
was required to consider: (1) the appropriateness of the organization's
purposes for collecting personal information and2(2) the circumstances
surrounding the determination of those purposes.
The Commissioner concluded that a reasonable person would not
consider CP's purposes for collecting personal information appropriate
under the circumstances. 30 The Commissioner adopted a four-part test
in determining whether CP's use of surveillance cameras was
reasonable under the circumstances.31  Under this test, the
22Id. at 9.
23 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 5.
24 Id.
251Id. at 6.
26 id.
2"Seeid. at 10.
28 PIPEDA, supra note 1, at ch.5, § 5(3).
29 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 11.
30Id. at 15.
" Id. at 13.
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Commissioner looked at whether: (1) the measure was demonstrably
necessary to meet a specific need; (2) the measure was likely to be
effective in meeting that need; (3) the loss of privacy was proportional
to the benefit gained; and (4) there was a less privacy-invasive way of
achieving the same end.32
CP's installation of video surveillance cameras was not
demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need.33 The Commissioner
stated that there were only a few documented incidents of vandalism
and theft, most of which had been to the cameras themselves.
34
Further, CP's actual risk from potential liability for the damage of
property to third party contractors was unclear. 3 5 As a result, the
Commissioner concluded that though there may be a potential
problem, "CP Rail has not demonstrated the existence of a real and
specific one."
36
Because a demonstrable need for video surveillance cameras was
not shown, the Commissioner concluded that CP was hard-pressed to
argue that the cameras have been a definite deterrent. 37  The
Commissioner stated that "[iun fact, it could be argued that the signs
warning 3eople entering the site may have deterred would-be
vandals."
CP's installation of video surveillance cameras in its workplace
may have caused an adverse psychological effect of a perceived
privacy invasion. 39 In balancing the loss of privacy against the benefit
gained, the Commissioner recognized that the cameras may possibly
identify an individual during the day despite the system's poor picture
resolution, "though it would be difficult to do so.'
32 Id.
33 See id. at 14.
34 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 14.
35 id.
36 Id.
37 id.
38 Id.
39 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 14.
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CP did not evaluate whether there was a less privacy-invasive way
of achieving deterrence of vandalism and theft, reducing CP's
potential liability for property damage, and providing security for its
staff.4 1 The Commissioner concluded that it did not appear that CP
evaluated the cost and effectiveness of alternative means to achieving
the same result, such as "better lighting in the parking lots, which
could address the issue of employee security, with no effect on
employee privacy.,
42
Thus, based on his four-part test, the Commissioner held that a
reasonable person would not consider CP's purposes for collecting
personal information appropriate under the circumstances. As a result,
the Commissioner concluded that CP violated subsection 5(3) of
PIPEDA.4
3
2. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT PROCEEDING
On February 13, 2003, Eastmond initiated a proceeding to the
Federal Circuit Court under subsection 14(1) of PIPEDA.44 Under that
provision, "[a] complainant may, after receiving the Commissioner's
report, apply to the Court for a hearing in respect of any matter in
respect of which the complaint was made, or that is referred to in the
Commissioner's report. ' 4  In initiating the proceeding in the Federal
Court, Eastmond sought the following orders: (1) an order confirming
the report of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada that CP cease
operating and remove the digital video camera system; (2) an order
that any records including any videotape recordings in the possession,
control, or custody of CP generated by the surveillance system be
destroyed; and (3) an order that CP cease and desist from installing
non-operational cameras or camera systems in and around its
workplaces in Canada, without the consent of the employees'
collective bargaining agent.46
41 See id.
42 Id.
4 3 See id. at 15.
44 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 16.
45 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch.5, § 14(1).
46 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 18.
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In evaluating Eastmond's claims, the Court addressed the
following issues: (1)whether the Court had jurisdiction to hear
Eastmond's complaint; (2) what kind of proceeding was required of
the Court under subsection 14 of PIPEDA and how much deference is
owed to the Privacy Commissioner's findings; and (3) whether CP
breached its PIPEDA obligations.
47
i. DOES THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
HEAR EASTMOND'S COMPLAINT?
The Court concluded that the dispute between Eastmond and CP
fell within the Court's jurisdiction under PIPEDA.48 Eastmond
invoked subsection 14 of PIPEDA as the principle basis under which
the Court had jurisdiction over his complaint.49  CP argued that
because the Privacy Commissioner lacked jurisdiction over
Eastmond's complaint, the Court also lacked jurisdiction.5 ° CP further
asserted that because the essential character of Eastmond's complaint
involved a dispute arising from the interpretation, application,
administration, or violation of the collective bargaining agreement
entered into between CP and Eastmond's union, the complaint was
under the jurisdiction of an arbitrator. 5 1
Under subsection 14 of PIPEDA, two conditions must be met to
obtain a hearing by the Court: (1) a complainant must apply to the
Court for a hearing; and (2) the hearing must be in connection with
any matter in respect of which the complaint is made or that is referred
to in the Commissioner's report.52 The Court concluded that both
conditions were met in this instance.53
The Court then concluded that the exclusive arbitration model
holding under Canada's Supreme Court case, Weber v. Ontario Hydro,
41 See id. at 72-88.
41Seeid. at 115.
4
1 See id. at 75.
50 Id. at 72.
5 Id. at 73.
52 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch. 5, § 14.
" Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 90.
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[1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, was not applicable to Eastmond's complaint.5 4
Under Weber, the Supreme Court held that if the "essential character
of the dispute between the parties arises either explicitly or implicitly
from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of a
collective agreement, the dispute, if the legislature expressed itself to
that effect, is within the sole jurisdiction of an arbitrator."5 5  The
Court, instead, viewed the issue of standing as between the two
statutory regimes of PIPEDA and the Canada Labour Code.56 Justice
Lemieux reviewed other cases in which jurisdictional conflict was at
issue and concluded that whether a dispute is within the sole
jurisdiction of an arbitrator is dependent upon the essential character of
the dispute between the parties. To determine the essential character
of a dispute, it was "necessary to look at the nature of the dispute in
the factual context in which it arose and the ambit of the collective
agreement.
58
Here, the Court found that Eastmond specifically engaged PIPEDA
in his complaint and that there was nothing in the employees'
collective bargaining agreement that dealt with personal information
and how it may be collected in the workplace. 59 Rather, the agreement
only covered disputes over "discrimination, interference, restriction or
coercion permitted in the workplace with respect to race, national or
ethnic origin, colour [sic], religion, age, sex, marital status, family
status, sexual orientation, disability or conviction for which a pardon
has been granted., 60 Thus, the dispute between Eastmond and CP did
not arise from the collective bargaining agreement, and arbitration was
not the proper forum.
541d. at 92.
" Id. atl 108.
6Id. at 95.
57 See id. at 94-109.
58 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 109.
"gSeeid. at 114.
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ii. WHAT KIND OF PROCEEDING IS REQUIRED OF THE COURT UNDER
SUBSECTION 14 OF PIPEDA?
A proceeding under subsection 14 of PIPEDA is not a review of
the Privacy Commissioner's report or his recommendation; rather, it is
a de novo review by the Court, a view CP espoused.61 Eastmond
asserted that in hearing his complaint, the Court should apply the
standard of review of the Privacy Commissioner, reasonableness
simpliciter. 62 CP, on the other hand, argued that the proceeding before
the Court should be a de novo hearing, giving no weight to the Privacy
Commissioner's findings.
63
Agreeing with CP, the Court concluded that under subsection 14 of
PIPEDA, it is the burden of the person who made a complaint to the
Privacy Commissioner to demonstrate that CP violated its PIPEDA
obligations. 64 Although the Court recognized that the Commissioner
should be accorded some deference in the area of his expertise, the
Court failed to accord deference to the Commissioner's findings of
fact.65 The Court stated that the evidence before it was considerably
different from that gathered by the Commissioner.
66
iii. DID CP BREACH ITS PIPEDA OBLIGATIONS?
The Court concluded that CP did not breach its PIPEDA
obligations.67 In making this determination, the Court stated that there
were two issues that needed to be addressed: (1) whether CP's reasons
for collecting personal information of its employees through
surveillance camera recordings were purposes that a reasonable person
would consider appropriate under the circumstances; and (2) if CP's
purposes were appropriate, whether CP violated its PIPEDA
6 See id. at T 118.
621 d. at 72.
63 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 77.
64 Id. at T 118.
65 See id. at 120-33.
66Id. at 123.
67 See id. at 192.
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obligations by not obtaining the consent of its employees and others
before collecting the information through its cameras.69
a. WERE CP's PURPOSES REASONABLY APPROPRIATE?
The Court held that a reasonable person would consider CP's
purposes for collecting data through its video surveillance cameras
appropriate under the circumstances. In doing so, the Court adopted
the Privacy Commissioner's four-part test that addressed whether: (1)
the measure was demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need; (2)
the measure was likely to be effective in meeting that need; (3) the loss
of privacy was proportional to the benefit gained; and (4d there was a
less privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end. The Court
noted that this test was in line with Parliament's intent to have a
balancing of interests:
71
Parliament clearly provided the appropriateness of purposes
or why personal information needs to be collected must be
analysed [sic] in a contextual manner looking at the
particular circumstances of why, how, when and where
collection takes place. Also, the appropriate purposes for
collection may be different than the appropriate purposes for
use and the appropriate purposes for disclosure of collected
information, all of which suggests flexibility and variability
in accordance with the circumstances.72
The Court then cited to previous arbitration cases involving
employers' use of surveillance cameras and concluded that arbitrators
distinguish between instances of collecting personal information
through surreptitious means and instances where employees and others
are informed. /3 From these precedents, the Court reasoned that CP
6 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 125.
69 1d. at 174.
70 See id. at 127-28.
7, Id. at 129.
72 Idat 131.
"3 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 133-73.
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established a legitimate need to have the cameras installed given the
"whole of the evidence" by identifying numerous past incidents, which
justified the need for the video surveillance cameras. 74 Moreover, the
Court concluded that the cameras were an effective means of meeting
CP's needs, the loss of privacy was minimal, and CP had looked at
alternatives to achieving the same end.75 On the whole of the
evidence, CP established that there had been no recorded incidents of
vandalism or theft since the cameras were installed, and that the use of
fencing and security guards would disrupt CP's operations. 76 Thus,
the Court held that CP's purposes were reasonably appropriate under
the circumstances.
b. WAS CONSENT REQUIRED To COLLECT THE INFORMATION?
CP was able to collect Eastmond's personal information without
his knowledge and consent under subsection 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA.77
Under that provision,
an organization may collect personal information without the
knowledge or consent of the individual only if... (b) it is
reasonable to expect that the collection with the knowledge
or consent of the individual would compromise the
availability or the accuracy of the information and the
collection is reasonable for purposes related to investigating
a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of
Canada or a province[.] 78
CP argued that the words "except where inappropriate" in subsection
4.3 of Schedule 1 to PIPEDA are self-standing and enable the Court to
make a determination of when it is unnecessary to obtain the
knowledge and consent of the individual whose personal information
is being collected.7 9 The Court disagreed. It stated, "the words of an
74Id. at 177.
7 5 See id. at 180-82.
76 id.
77 Seeid. at 189.
78 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch.5, § 7(1)(b).
79 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 183.
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Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament."
80
In this instance, the Court concluded that CP fell within subsection
7(1)(b)'s exemption.8' CP established that the videotaped recordings
were never viewed unless there was a triggering event and that there
was no CP official looking at the monitor when the cameras were
operating.82 As a result, CP collected personal information only when
CP officials viewed the recordings to investigate an incident. 83 Thus,
PIPEDA's exemption applied.
C. DISCUSSION
1. JURISDICTION
The Federal Court's holding on standing was based on two
concurrent statutory regimes operating in concert. On the one hand,
PIPEDA provided relief for individuals who satisfied the statutory
requirements of subsection 14.84 On the other hand, the Canada
Labour Code mandated that disputes arising under a collective
bargaining agreement are to be resolved through arbitration. 85 The
Court rejected the Canadian Supreme Court's Weber analysis, which
would have required the Court to determine whether the legislature
intended a dispute to be governed by a collective bargaining agreement
or the statutory regime because the two statutory regimes were not in
conflict.86 In other words, a Weber analysis is required only "when it
is necessary to decide which of the two competing statutory regimes
should govern a dispute." 87  The Court concluded that because
80 Id. at 184 (citing Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] S.C.R. 27, 21).
81 Id. at 187.
82 See id. at 188.
83 id.
8 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 90.
851Id. at 95.
86 See id. at 99.
87 Id. at 96 (citing Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioner,
[2000] S.C.R. 360, 373-74).
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PIPEDA and the Canada Labour Code were not in conflict, to resolve
which regime took precedence required the Court to look at whether
the "essential character of the dispute" arose either explicitly or
implicitly from the collective agreement. 88 Nothing in the Eastmond
agreement dealt with personal information and how it may be collected
in the workplace. 89 As a result, the essential character of the dispute,
i.e. the collection of personal information, did not arise explicitly or
implicitly from the collective agreement, and the Court had
jurisdiction over the matter.90
2. THE DE Novo STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court in Eastmond stated that under subsection 14 of
PIPEDA, a de novo standard of review was required.9' Justice
Lemieux concluded that because a complaint initiated under PIPEDA
was neither an appeal of the Privacy Commissioner's report, nor an
application for judicial review, a de novo review was appropriate. 92
The Court was unclear, however, as to how much deference should be
given to the Commissioner's report. On the one hand, the Court stated
that it would "accord the Privacy Commissioner some deference in the
area of his expertise which would include appropriate recognition to
the factors he took into account in balancing the privacy interests of
the applicant and CP's legitimate interest in protecting its employees
and property."93 On the other, the Court stated that it does "not accord
any deference on the Commissioner's findings of fact." 94 This limited
deference given to the Privacy Commissioner's report gives little
guidance for other Courts to apply in the future.
881d. at 108.
8 9 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 114.
90 See id.
91 See id. at I 119 (citing Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., [2003] F.C. 705).
92 id.
93 1d. at 122.
94 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 123.
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3. THE FOUR-PART TEST
Both the Privacy Commissioner and the Federal Circuit Court
agreed on the test to determine whether the purposes for collecting
personal information are those a reasonable person would consider
appropriate. Under this test, four factors are considered: (1) the
necessity of the purpose to meet a specific need; (2) the effectiveness
of the purpose in meeting that need; (3) the proportionality of the loss
of privacy to the benefit gained; and (4) whether there is a less
privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end.95  However, the
Commissioner and the Court disagreed upon the application of the
facts. The Court noted that "[t]he Privacy Commissioner took no
position on whether the evidence before him...satisfied the four-part
test.' 96 Applying the facts to the four-part test, the Court distinguished
instances where surveillance cameras were used and were not in
contravention of PIPEDA, and instances where such usage violated the
Act.97 The Court stated "arbitrators have drawn a bright line between
surreptitious collection of information and collection of information by
cameras whose locations are known, where employees and others are
told recordings are being made and the use of those recordings."
98
This position is consistent with other cases involving PIPEDA.99
In Eastmond, the cameras were not surreptitiously hidden; rather
there were warning signs of their locations.100 Given the whole of the
evidence, the Court concluded that a reasonable person would consider
CP's purposes for collecting personal information appropriate under
the circumstances. 
101
951d. at 127.
96 1d. at 85.
9
' See id. at 132.
98 id.
99 See PIPEDA Case Summary #264 (Feb. 19, 2004), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/
cf-dc/2004/cf-dc_040219 01 e.asp; PIPEDA Case Summary #268 (Apr. 12, 2004), available
at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2004/cf-dc040412_e.asp; see also PIPEDA Case
Summary #273 (May 28, 2004), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2004/cf-
dc_040518e.asp; PIPEDA Case Summary #279 (July 26, 2004), available at
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2004/cf-dc_040726_e.asp.
'0o Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 176.
'0' Id. at 177.
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4. CONSENT
After concluding that CP's purposes for installing the surveillance
cameras were appropriate under the circumstances, the Court
addressed whether CP was required to have employee consent to
collect the information.1°2 The Court approached the issue as a matter
of statutory interpretation. 10 3  In interpreting subsection 7(1) of
PIPEDA, the Court looked at that provision in its entire context, in
accordance with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words in
connection "with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament."''
4
Subsection 7(1) of PIPEDA was clear in proscribing only four
instances where personal information may be collected without
knowledge of consent. These instances are: (1) where the collection is
clearly in the interests of the individual and consent cannot be obtained
in a timely way; (2) where it is reasonable to expect that the collection
with the knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise
the availability or the accuracy of the information, and the collection is
reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an
agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada or a province; (3)
where the collection is solely for journalistic, artistic, or literary
purposes; or (4) where the information is publicly available and is
specified by the regulations. 10 5 In Eastmond, the Court determined
that the videotaped recordings were not reviewed unless there was a
triggering event. 10 6 Moreover, to ask for permission to collect the
information resulting from ainvestigation would compromise the
availability of the information. 07 Thus, CP fell within the second
category in which it was not obliged to obtain consent of its employees
in obtaining the personal information.1
08
'02 See id. at 1125.
'
03 See id. at 1 185.
104Id. at 184 (citing Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 121).
105 PIPEDA, supra note 1, ch. 5, § 7(1).
'06 Eastmond, [2004] F.C. at 188.
'
071d. at 189.
10' See id. at 187.
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D. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit Court has made it clear that an employee may
invoke PIPEDA to seek redress from an organization that has collected
personal information through video surveillance cameras installed in
the workplace. Through its four-part balancing test, organizations may
utilize the Court's holding as guidance in implementing collection of
personal information measures. In the wake of PIPEDA's full
extension into both public and private organizations since January
2004, the effects of the Act have been and will undoubtedly continue
to be heard through the Canadian court system.
III. THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT: JAPAN'S
SIGNIFICANT STEP IN LEGISLATING PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
A. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2003, the Japanese Diet (Japan's National Legislature)
enacted the Personal Information Protection Act. 10 9 The Act, although
not the first piece of legislation passed by the Diet in an attempt to
protect the privacy of Japanese citizens, is Japan's most
comprehensive piece of privacy legislation to date." 0 Although the
Act was passed in 2003, its implementation and enforcement
procedures continue to unfold.'1 ' Japan and its national ministries
currently face the challenge of rulemaking and legislative
interpretation in both the public and private sectors, balancing the
difficulty of compliance with the ever present backdrop of the
legislative purpose: protecting its citizens' personal information.
112
American businesses in Japan will also be subject to the Act's
provisions. Although many such businesses have taken action in order
to ensure compliance with the Act, American businesses may not fully
109 Cedric Laurant & Privacy International, Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Japan (2003), at
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/ apan.htm.
110 Dr. Masao Horibe, Privacy and Personal Information Protection in Japan: Past, Present
and Future (Feb. 13, 2003), at http://www.export.gov/apececommerce/privacy/
2003workshop/horibe.pdf.
1 Dr. Alan F. Westin, Greetings From the Director (Apr. 12, 2004), at
www.privacyexchange.org/japan/greetings.html.
112 Id.
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grasp the Act's effects until enforcement measures are firmly in
place. 1
13
All of this unfolds, as Columbia University Professor Alan F.
Westin, Program Director of the Japan-U.S. Privacy and Data Protec-
tion Program has described, during "a time of deep social change in
Japan, when the roles of individuals, non-profit organizations, local
government, the educational system, and other key areas of Japanese
life are in significant transition." 114 This social change may have a
direct bearing on how the Act will be interpreted. The Act essentially
prescribes how Japanese institutions should protect Japanese citizens'
personal information. If Japan's social climate is truly in flux though,
interpretation of the Act may vary amongst ministries, regions, and
businesses. Interpretation could even be contrary to original notions
and assumptions made by the Japanese legislature.
This piece, however, serves not as a predictor of the Act's
implementation, but rather as a guide to Japan's Personal Information
Protection Act: its history, the body of the Act itself, and a
comparative analysis to other countries' privacy legislation. For
experts, this piece may serve as a quick reference tool. For non-
experts interested in the privacy arena or the Act's effect on American
business, it will provide a substantive overview.
B. HISTORY OF THE ACT AND THE PRIVACY BACKDROP IN JAPAN
In 1999, Dr. Westin, with the assistance of Japanese advisor Mr.
Jun Sofue, polled one thousand adults drawn from a representative
sample of the Japanese population in an attempt to gauge the
populace's general attitude toward issues in privacy. '15  The results
showed that a strong majority of the populace was worried about
privac issues and the mismanagement of their personal informa-
tion. 11 For instance:
113 Center for Social and Legal Research, Japan Privacy Resource on Consumer, Citizen, and
Employee Privacy: Privacy Policies, at http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/
japanindex.html (last updated May 6, 2004).
114 Dr. Alan F. Westin, supra note 111.
115 Dr. Alan F. Westin & Adams Communication Ltd., Japan Privacy Resource on Consumer,
Citizen, and Employee Privacy: Reports/Surveys, Japan National Consumer Privacy Survey
(Dec. 19, 1999), at http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/westinsurvey_ 1999.pdf.
116 id.
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1) 88.8% had read or heard stories in the media about
personal privacy in Japan in 1998;
2) 76.6% were concerned about the potential misuse of
personal information;
3) 67% believed that consumers had lost all control over
how personal information is collected and used by
companies; and
4) 65.7% believed that existing law did not adequately
protect privacy concerns. 11
7
The percentages, although already indicative of a tendency towards
popular dissatisfaction with privacy matters in Japan, would have
likely been higher if the same poll were taken in 2002. The Japanese
media in the years immediately preceding the passing of the Act
reported extensively on privacy violations by both businesses and the
government in Japan."18 Most of the privacy violations committed by
businesses and reported by the Japanese media involved identity theft
and the disclosure of personal information via the Internet. The
reports concerning government violations were similar in nature and
highlighted the government's negligent handling of citizens' personal
information. 120  These media reports could only contribute to the
Japanese populace's dissatisfaction and mistrust in both the public and
private sectors, as well as serving to notify Japanese officials that
action needed to be taken.
Japan did not have national omnibus privacy legislation prior to the
enactment of the Personal Information Protection Act. t12  Prior to
enactment, the government emphasized self-regulation, and organiza-
117 id.
118 Dr. Alan F. Westin & Vivian van Gelder, Japan Privacy Resource on Consumer, Citizen,
and Employee Privacy: Home/Feature Items, Special Issue on Consumer Privacy in Japan and
the New National Privacy Law: Implications for U.S. Business, Implications for Japanese
Companies, PRIVACY & AM. Bus.: A Comprehensive Report and Information Service (Nov.
2003), available at http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/japanindex.html., page 8.
119 Id. at 8.
120 Id. at 9.
121 Dr. Masao Horibe, supra note 110.
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tions associated with government ministries, such as the Japan Infor-
mation Processing Development Corporation ("JIPDEC"), assisted in
this self-regulation. 122  JIPDEC created the "System for Granting
Marks of Confidence for Privacy and Personal Data Protection.
This system allowed Japanese businesses that were concerned with
consumer perceptions of privacy to become certified with JIPDEC.
JIPDEC based this certification on the personal data handlin guide-
lines articulated in the Japan Industrial Standard, Q15001.12 Such
certification would presumably increase consumer confidence in that
certified business. Although the government emphasized self-regula-
tion, many local governments passed data protection ordinances. 2 5
By April 2003, 74% of local governments had passed such ordi-
nances.126 The status of privacy protection in Japan prior to the Act
was comparable to the United States' current system. As it currently
stands, the United States does not have a single, comprehensive
privacy law. 1
27
In response to the privacy concerns in Japan, the government
organized an expert committee to draft provisions for an omnibus
privacy law on January 27, 2000.128 The expert committee released an
outline of the legislation on October 11 2000, and the bill itself was
approved by the Cabinet in March 200 1.29 The bill then moved on to
the Diet, where it faced significant opposition. At the forefront of this
opposition was the Japanese media.' The bill failed to exclude
newsgathering activities from its scope, and the media feared that their
122 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 5.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 6.
126 Id. (2413 out of 3260 local governments had passed data protection ordinances.)
127 PETER P. SwiRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 2 (1998).
128 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 11.
1291d. at 12.
30 Id. at 13.
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ability to report the news, especially news involving off-the-record
disclosures about politicians, would be thwarted. 131
The opposition grew in its activity from Feneral rumblings to
intense protests spearheaded by media groups. 13  As a result, the bill
eventually failed in the Diet on December 13, 2002.113 The bill was
soon revised, and in the revision, the media was granted immunity
from the bill's requirements when handling personal information. 
"4
Although some opposition still remained, the bill was passed on May
6, 2003.135 According to Dr. Westin and Vivian van Gelder (Legal
Director of the Japan-U.S. Privacy and Data Protection Program), the
opposition was quelled due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of
2003.136 The Japanese government supported the invasion, and the
government, including the opposition to the Personal Information
Protection Bill, turned its attention to these pressing matters in foreign
affairs. 137 As a result of this diversion, the Bill was passed.
131 id.
'
32 Id at 14.
133 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 15.
134 Id. at 15-16.
135 Id. at 16.
136 id.
137 1d.
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C. THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT138
What is relevant from the Personal Information Protection Act
depends upon who is reading the Act and for what reason. An
American business attempting to conduct business within Japan's
borders will likely read and contemplate the entire Act. The following
is an explication of the Act's most relevant Articles. Some are basic
provisions that all privacy scholars should be acquainted with, while
others are business-specific.
Chapter 1. Article 1 sets forth the purpose of the Act. Specifi-
cally, the Act has the purpose of "protecting the rights and welfare of
individuals." Article 1 also assigns responsibility for implementation
to both the public (national government and local public entities) and
the private sectors (businesses which handle personal information). 13 9
Article 2 provides definitions for the Act. "Personal information,"
as used in the Act, is defined as "information that relates to living
individuals and which can be used to identify specific individuals by
name, date of birth, or other description (including that which can be
easily compared with other information and thereby used to identify
138 The Act's chapters and subchapters are listed here as a reference source for the explication
that follows.
The Personal Information Protection Act:
Chapter 1: General Provisions (Articles 1-3)
Chapter 2: Duties of National Government and Local Public Entites, Etc. (Articles 4-6)
Chapter 3: Measures, Etc. for the protection of Personal Information
Subchapter 1: Basic Policy Concerning the Protection of Personal Information
(Article 7)
Subchapter 2: Measures of the National Government (Articles 8-10)
Subchapter 3: Measures of the Local Public Entities (Articles 11-13)
Subchapter 4: Cooperation between National Government and Local Public Entities
(Article 14)
Chapter 4: Duties, Etc. of Businesses Handling Personal Information
Subchapter 1: Duties of Businesses Handling Personal Information (Articles 15-36)
Subchapter 2: Promotion of the Protection of Personal Information by Private
Organizations (Articles 37-49)
Chapter 5: Miscellaneous Provisions (Articles 50-55)
Chapter 6: Penalty Provisions (Articles 56-59)
Supplemental Provisions
An English translation of the Personal Information Protection Act can be located online at:
The Personal Information Protection Act, JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN,
AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: LAwS/REGULATIONS (2003), available at
http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/japanindex.html.
139 id.
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specific individuals)." A "principal" is defined in the Act as the
individual who is the subject of the personal information.140
Chapter 2. Articles 4, 5, and 6 provide the national government
and local public entities with the power to devise and execute
measures necessary to secure the appropriate handling of personal
information.1 4 1 Specifically, the national government is prescribed
with "the duty to comprehensively devise [sic] and execute measures
necessary to secure the appropriate handling of personal
[i]nformation in accordance with the spirit of [the] law." Local
public entities are given the same power, but they are to devise and
execute measures "according to the characteristics of the regions under
the jurisdiction of such local public entities." 143 This Chapter provides
local governance with some flexibility in implementing the Act.
Chapter 3. Subchapters 2, 3, and 4 describe the power given to the
national government and local public entities, and give details of the
supportive relationship between the two entities that is to take place as
the Act unfolds. Local entities are to be especially supportive to
businesses and residents within their areas of jurisdiction. They also
are to mediate in the processing of grievances in order to achieve an
appropriate and timely handling of such grievances. 144
Chapter 4. Chapter 4 primarily outlines the duties of businesses
handling personal information. This chapter is the most extensive of
all the chapters in the Act.
Subchapter 1, Article 15, states that a business must specify, to the
extent possible, the purpose for using personal information. If that
purpose changes, the change must not exceed the scope "reasonably
recognized as having an appropriate connection with the original
[p]urpose of [u]se."' What is "reasonable" and "appropriate" will
surely be subject to scrutiny and interpretation.1 46
140 Id.
141 id.
142 id
143 JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
LAWs/REGULATIONS, supra note 138.
144 id.
145 id.
146 Id.
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Subchapter 1, Article 16 states that if a business is to stray from the
original purpose of use, consent must be obtained from the principal.
Article 16 also states that a succeeding business (e.g., in a merger or
acquisition scenario) must use personal information obtained from the
previous business within the scope of that previous business's original
purpose. If the succeeding business wants to use that personal
information for another purpose, the succeeding business must obtain
consent from the principal. There are, however, exceptions articulated
in Article 16 for when consent is not required if a business is to use
personal information outside of the original stated purpose. For
instance, if it is necessary for the protection of human life, safety, or
property, consent to use the principal's personal information is not
required. 147
Article 17 explicitly forbids a business from obtaining personal
information by fraud or other unfair means. 
148
Article 18 states that a business initially acquiring personal
information must notify the principal(s) or publicly announce the
purpose for the use of the personal information. If the information is
acquired by a business via contract from a principal, then the acquiring
business must disclose the purpose of use to the principal in advance.
Exceptions to the rules articulated in Article 18 are also provided. 149
Article 19 states that a business handling personal information
must diligentl attempt to maintain the accuracy of that personal
information. 15a
Article 20 prescribes that a "[b]usiness [h]andling [p]ersonal
[i]nformation must adopt measures necessary and appropriate for
preventing the unauthorized disclosure.' ' 5 Again, what is
"necessary" and "appropriate" will surely be subject to interpretation
and scrutiny by the government and businesses.1
52
Articles 20 and 21 assign the same "necessary" and "appropriate"
standard to the supervision of employees who handle personal
147 id.
14 8 JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
LAWs/REGULATIONS, supra note 138.
149 id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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information for a business, as well as to delegatees who have been
delegated this information in some form by a business.153
Article 23 outlines restrictions on businesses providing information
to third parties. Essentially, businesses are not to provide information
to. third parties without the consent of the principal. There are
exceptions to this rule of consent, however, and there are situations
where a perceived third party may not actually be a third party. Both
of these situational categories are also outlined in Article 23.
Subchapter 1, Article 24 discusses various appeasement measures
that a business utilizing personal information must undertake for a
principal. Items such as the name or title of the business handling the
principal's personal information, as well as that business's purpose of
use, must be "easily learned" by the principal.' 55
Article 25 states that if a business handling personal information
has been requested by a principal to disclose information identifying
that principal, then the business must promptly disclose such
information. There are exceptions to this rule as well, outlined in
Article 25.156
Article 27 asserts that if a principal believes an Article 16 or
Article 17 violation has occurred, and the business handling the
principal's information finds that there are grounds for this charge,
then the business must cease using that principal's personal
information without delay.'I 7
Article 28 provides that if a business handling personal
information notifies a principal that it does not plan to take all or a
portion of the measures requested by the principal regarding the
principal's personal information, or that it plans to take measures
different from the principal's request, then it must use its "best efforts"
to provide the principal with an explanation of its reasons for that
decision. 158
153 JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
LAWS/REGULATIONS, supra note 138.
154 id.
15s Id.
156 id.
157 Id.
... JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
LAWS/REGULATIONS, supra note 138.
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Articles 29-31 are procedure-oriented, describing a business's
mandated procedure for dealing with requests for disclosure,
processing a grievance, etc.
159
Articles 32-36 primarily discuss the role of the State Minister.
Article 32 designates authority in a State Minister to require a business
to submit a report detailing the business's handling of personal
information for enforcement purposes. 16  Article 34 describes
admonishments and orders that the State Minister may issue against a
business if the Minister believes that such an action is necessary for
the protection of individual rights or welfare. The Minister will look
primarily to Articles 16-18 and 20-27 for violations. Article 35 places
limitations on the State Minister's authority, while Article 36 describes
the State Minister's position and role.16
1
Articles 37-49 outline the formation and the standards that must be
followed by private organizations wishing to become involved in the
protection of personal information.
162
Chapter 5. Article 50 provides for exclusions to the Personal
Information Protection Act. Exclusions have been created for: (1)
broadcast organizations, newspapers, news agencies, or other reporting
organizations (essentially all organizations whose purpose is to report);
(2) individuals who are writers by trade; (3) universities or
organizations having the purpose of scholarly research or individuals
belonging thereto; (4) religious bodies; and (5) political
organizations. 163
Chapter 6. Articles 56-59 outline the penalties for noncompliance
with the Act. A person who violates an order made pursuant to a
provision of Article 34 (admonishments and orders), paragraphs 2 and
3, shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than six months or a
fine of not more than 300,000 yen (roughly $3,000 U.S. dollars).
Article 32 (collection of reports), and Article 46 (another collection
and reports) violations may result in fines not to exceed 300,000
yen.'16
159 Id.
160Oid.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 JAPAN PRIVACY RESOURCE ON CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND EMPLOYEE PRIVACY:
LAWS/REGULATIONS, supra note 138.
164id.
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D. THE NEXT STEPS
The public and private sectors have varying responsibilities now to
ensure a successful transition into the Act's oversight. With respect to
the public sector, the government is mobilizing to coordinate oversight
and enforcement of the Act among appropriate Ministries.165  The
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare will supervise privacy issues
dealing with employee information under the Act. 166 It is assumed that
the Ministry of Finance will oversee privacy issues dealing with
financial institutions under the Act, and the Ministry of Trade,
Industry, and Economy will likely be charged with oversight for
commercial and industrial companies. 167 The Cabinet, as well as the
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and
Telecommunications, will also likely be named to coordinate oversight
of the Act within an appropriate sector.' 68 Given the broad scope of
the Act, it is likely that the government will be forced to draft national
industry-specific regulations. At the local level, local government will
likely draft individual sector-based laws.
169
For the private sector, the Act is not yet in operation as of this
writing. The provisions affecting the private sector, according to a
draft Cabinet order, will come into force April 1, 2005.170 This
provides businesses with time to re-examine their personal information
policies and take measures to comply with the Act. 171  However,
businesses, both strictly Japanese-based as well as U.S.-based
businesses with branch offices in Japan, have started preparing for the
April 1 enforcement date. 172 U.S. companies with Japanese offices
165 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 23.
166 Shinji Kusakabe & Nobuhito Sawasaki, Data Protection Law Poses Problems for M&A:
Japan 's New Data Protection Law Limits Access to Personal Information in the Due
Diligence Process, 24 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 1, 4 (2005).
167 Id. at 4.
168 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 21.
169 Id. at 23.
7o Id. at 22.
... Id. at 32.
172 Japan Privacy Resource on Consumer, Citizen, and Employee Privacy: Privacy Policies, at
http://www.privacyexchange.org/japan/japanpolicies.htm. (last updated May 6, 2004).
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such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Morgan Stanley, Walt Disney,
Yahoo!, Apple, McDonald's, Pepsi, Pfizer, and IBM have all created
privacy policies that they publicly post on their Japanese-based
websites. 73 U.S.-friendly Japanese-based companies are following
suit. Companies such as Asahi, Canon, Sony, and Toyota now post
privacy policies on their websites as well.1
74
E. U.S. BUSINESS SPECIFICALLY
The Japanese government has written the Act so that only personal
information managed in Japan falls within the Act's jurisdiction. 175
Therefore, American businesses with a branch office in Japan must
abide by Japan's new privacy legislation when managing information
in Japan. 176 At the same time, an American business hoping to do
business with Japan, but without any kind of Japanese branch office,
will not be under the Act's authority until it actually starts to manage
personal information within Japan.
American companies have been fortunate to remain absent from
media stories in Japan regarding negligent data handling and sales of
personal data. 177 Thus, the ire of the Japanese people has been fixated
on Japanese entities, both businesses and the government. There are
ambiguities in the Act, though, that in the near future will likely draw
attention to American businesses with branch offices in Japan. The
new Act appears to lack any restriction on the transfer of personal
information originating in but traveling outside of Japan. So,
American branch offices can transfer Japanese personal information to
their headquarters in America unscathed, assuming that there are no
provisions of the Act being violated during that action. 179  More
specifically, the Act makes no distinction between transfers of
personal information to third parties inside Japan and to third parties
17 3 id.
174 Id.
175 Kusakabe & Sawasaki, supra note 166, at 2.
176 id.
177 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 29.
178 id.
179 id.
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outside of Japan.' 8 0 This provides American businesses with a great
deal of leeway with Japanese personal information, especially because
it is not entirely clear that the term "third party" includes subsidiaries,
parent companies, or affiliates of a subject business.181
According to Dr. Westin and Ms. van Gelder, the major impact of
the Act on American companies operating within Japan is the basic
preparation that must occur for compliance.' 82 Information systems
must be upgraded to comply with the new legal requirements for
security. A system will also be required to respond to requests in
relation to the use of personal data from customers and employees. 83
Also, the Act will have implications on American direct marketing
techniques in the Japanese market. 84 Current American marketing
techniques rely on the free availability of personal information. 8
American marketers use detailed personal information to match the
marketing of products to the consumer, and the Personal Information
Protection Act will make it difficult to apply such methods to the
Japanese market.1
86
F. A COMPARISON: U.S. - EUROPEAN UNION - JAPAN
In comparing three of the world's most prolific economies, all
three have very divergent forms of privacy regulation and legislation.
The American system of regulating privacy does not have a single
comprehensive privacy87 law or a single agency charged with
administering privacy."  Whereas the United States may be
considered generally lax with its privacy regulation and legislation, the
European Union could be considered to be its polar opposite. The
European Union's Directive on Data Protection ("European Privacy
Directive"), passed on October 25, 1998, strictly regulates privacy
18°Id. at 24.
181 id.
182 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 29.
183 id.
'
841d"
i5 id.
186 id.
187 SwIPE & LITAN, supra note 130, at 2.
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matters within the European Union and also regulates those countries
outside of the Union by requiring "adequate" protection from any
country that seeks to obtain the personal information of EU citizens.' 8
The European Privacy Directive has, and could continue to have,
significant effects on businesses and organizations outside of
Europe. 189 In comparison, foreign entities are not obliged to follow
Japan's Personal Information Protection Act unless personal
information is handled or managed within Japan's borders.' 9° The
Personal Information Protection Act, then, should not have the same
impact on foreign entities as seen by the passing of the European
Privacy Directive. There is no foreseeable "collision course" between
Japan and other countries, as there was between the European Union
and the United States upon the passing of the European Privacy
Directive. 191 At the same time, the Personal Information Protection
Act is similar to the European Privacy Directive, and quite divergent
from U.S. privacy regulation, in that the Act is an omnibus piece of
privacy legislation. The Act, however, has a U.S.-type regulation
mechanism in that enforcement is sectoral being charged to various
ministries and local government entities. 192 Although the Act is too
new to tell whether its "middle way" methodology, somewhere
between the poles of the United States and the European Union, will
be truly effective, a comparison of these three methods of regulating
and legislating privacy may reveal which method should serve as the
model for the rest of the international privacy community. 193
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of privacy legislation on the international front, the
dynamic interrelationships between countries require businesses and
institutions to cope with these recent privacy developments. The
enactment of Japan's Personal Information Protection Act and
Canada's PIPEDA illustrate the stark differences to which countries
188 Id.
189 id.
190 Kusakabe & Sawasaki, supra note 166, at 2.
191 SwlRE& LITAN, supra note 130, at 2.
192 Westin & van Gelder, supra note 118, at 32.
193 Id. at31.
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approach privacy issues. As a result, businesses and institutions that
conduct international business are forced to comprehend a multitude of
legislative provisions that may be in compliance with one country, yet
not another. With these uncertainties, businesses have restructured
and will continue to restructure organizationally and procedurally in
accordance with a country's respective privacy laws to ensure
compliance.
